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Abstract
This paper presents a theory where increases in female labor force participation and reductions in the gen-
der wage-gap are generated as part of the same process of demographic transition that leads to reductions
in fertility. There have been signiﬁcant increases in the labor supply of women in the last decades, both
in developed and developing countries. Traditional views explain this trend through the eﬀects of reduced
fertility and/or increased women’s wages. The paper suggests that all these changes can be understood as
part of a single process of demographic change, triggered by reductions in mortality. Mortality reductions
aﬀect the incentives of individuals to invest in human capital and to have children. Particularly, gains
in adult longevity reduce fertility, increase investments in market human capital, increase female labor
force participation, and reduce the wage diﬀerential between men and women. Child mortality reductions
cannot generate this same pattern of changes. The model reconciles the increase in female labor market
participation with the timing of age-speciﬁc mortality reductions observed during the demographic transi-
tion. The paper presents the ﬁrst model to link the change in the role of women in society to, ultimately,
the reductions in mortality that characterize the demographic transition.
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This paper presents a theory where increases in female labor supply and reductions in the gender
wage-gap arise as by-products of the classical process of demographic transition, characterized
by increases in life expectancy and reductions in fertility. In the theory, gains in longevity raise
the returns to human capital and reduce fertility, reducing the demand for household production.
As women are initially specialized in the household sector, these changes lead to increases in the
fraction of the productive lifetime that women allocate to the market, and, through changes in
human capital accumulation, to reductions in the wage diﬀerential between men and women. The
paper develops a model where households composed by two members (female and male) decide
on their allocation of time, number of oﬀs p r i n g ,a n dh u m a nc a p i t a li n v e s t m e n t si nc h i l d r e na n d
adults. It shows that, as long as women are marginally more productive at child raising, gains
in adult longevity lead to reductions in fertility, increases in female labor force participation, and
wage convergence between men and women. Reductions in child mortality, on the other hand,
do not generate these same stylized facts. Though reductions in child mortality reduce fertility,
they also increase the returns from investments in children, possibly even increasing the total
amount of time that women spend out of the labor force. The pattern of female labor force
participation generated by the model is consistent with the timing of reductions in age-speciﬁc
mortality observed during the historical experiences of fertility transition. Fertility reductions are
observed soon after the onset of expressive gains in life expectancy — when reductions in child
mortality still play a prominent role, while increases in female labor force participation appear
only later on — as adult mortality gains relative importance. Our model incorporates all these
dimensions into a uniﬁed theory of demographic change. In short, we present the ﬁrst model to
link the change in the role of women in society to, ultimately, the reductions in mortality that
characterize the demographic transition.
There have been profound changes in the labor supply of women in the last decades, both in
developed and developing countries. In the United States, female participation in the paid labor
force changed drastically in the course of the 20th century. In 1880, only 17% of all American
women at working ages participated in the labor market. By 2000, this number had risen to more
than 60%. At the same time, individuals and families were changing in other important ways.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of life expectancy, fertility and female labor force participation for the
United States between 1880 and 2000. Throughout the 20th century, life expectancy at birth rose
by 30 years, from 47 to 77. The total fertility rate dropped from above 4 to 2.1.1 These changes
1 The temporary increase in fertility in the post-war period is the well-known “baby-boom” phenomenon. Our
focus here is on the long term trend of fertility decline, which was only temporarily interrupted by the increased
1in life expectancy and fertility reﬂect trends that were observed at least since the beginning of
the 19th century, when the total fertility rate was above 7 points and life expectancy at birth was
below 40 years.
Figure 1: United States - Life Expectancy, Fertility and 
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Note: Total fertility rate prior to 1920 is for the black and white populations only.
Source: Costa (2000), National Center for Health Statistics (2003), and US Census Bureau (1975).
Over this same period, similar trends were observed in other developed countries. Figure 2
illustrates the case of Great Britain, where fertility dropped from 4.9 in 1851 to 1.7 in 2001, while
life expectancy at birth increased from 40 to 77 years. Also similarly, after some delay, female
labor force participation started rising, from 35% in 1900 to 53% in 2000.
These reductions in mortality and fertility are part of the process of demographic transition,
which spread through most of the world in the post-war period. The empirical pattern charac-
terizing the transition has been widely documented and discussed in the demographic literature.
It is usually understood as being marked by an initial reduction in child mortality, followed by
reductions in adult mortality and fertility (see, e.g., Heer and Smith, 1968, Cassen, 1978, Kirk,
1996, and Mason, 1997).2 Maybe less acknowledged is the fact that changes in female labor force
participation have also reached several of the “latecomers” of the demographic transition. Though
data in these cases are more recent and sparse, it is already possible to notice the trends.
fertility rate of the 1950’s and 1960’s.
2 There is still some controversy regarding the early experience of the ﬁrst Western European countries to go
through the demographic transition. Nevertheless, this sequence of events is accepted as an accurate description of
reality in the vast majority of cases.
2Figure 2: Great Britain - Life Expectancy, Fertility and 
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Source: Wrigley et al (1997), Keyfitz and Fieger (1968), Costa (2000) and World Bank (2003).
Figure 3 illustrates the demographic changes experienced by Brazil in the period between
1960 and 2000. In this forty-year interval, Brazil went through radical demographic changes: life
expectancy at birth rose from 55 to 68 years, while the total fertility rate declined from 6 to 2.2.
Though data on female labor force participation is not available before the mid 1970’s, the pattern
of the series suggests that modest increases were being observed before 1975. But it is really only
after 1980 that the increase in female labor force participation gained momentum. In the twenty
ﬁve years between 1975 and 2000, women’s labor market participation in Brazil increased from
39% to 58%. This pattern is not particular to Brazil. In the recent experience of the developing
world, the fraction of the labor force composed by women increased in almost every single country
where signiﬁcant reductions in fertility were observed (see World Bank, 2004).
Also, in the three experiences discussed in the ﬁgures — as well as in virtually every other
documented history of increased female labor force participation — the wage diﬀerential between
men and women has been shrinking. This is a quite general phenomenon, irrespective of cultural
tradition or level of economic development (see Blau and Kahn, 2000). We illustrate this point in
Table 1, with data for the three countries discussed before. Among the cases portrayed in Table
1, the highest degree of convergence is observed in Brazil, where the wage-gap was reduced by 15
percentage points in the period between 1979 and 1998.




















































Life Exp FLFP TFR
Country 1979 1989 1998
Change btwn 1979 
and 1998
Brazil 0.508 0.541 0.661 0.153
Great Britain 0.626 0.667 0.749 0.123
United States 0.625 0.706 0.763 0.138
Source: Blau and Kahn (2000) and Simão et al (2001).
Table 1: Female/Male Earnings Ratio
Notes: For the United States, the 1998 number corresponds to 1996. Median earnings for Great
Britan and the US, and mean earnings for Brazil
The implications of the increase in women’s labor force participation encompass issues such as
the bargaining power of husband and wife within the household, the enhanced role of women in
modern society, and the availability of parents to invest in children. On the one hand, this change
has been linked to cultural transformations within society, which led to a change in the role of
women in the household and in the labor market. On the other hand, economists have linked it
to rising wages and falling fertility. Though these closer explanations are relevant, they do not
identify the ultimate determinants of the observed trends. What is the underlying reason behind
society’s change of attitude toward women? Why did fertility decline and, even with rising labor
supply, why did women’s wages increase? Also less understood is the theoretical mechanism linking
the reductions in mortality to reductions in fertility, increases in female labor force attachment,
and narrowing of the gender wage-gap. Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that increased female
4labor force participation follows a quite general pattern, which, therefore, cannot be explained
by changes that are particular to one speciﬁc country. It must be part of a broader process of
social transformation, which seems to be directly associated with the demographic transition. The
empirical pattern of the transition has been thoroughly documented in the most diverse regions of
the world, but its relation to the subsequent increase in female labor force participation — which
is commonly regarded as an almost separate phenomenon — is still much less understood.
This paper suggests a single explanation for all these changes, based on the impact of reduc-
tions in mortality on household decisions regarding fertility and investments in human capital.
Particularly, we develop a model where gains in adult longevity reduce fertility and increase the
returns to investments in market-oriented human capital. Since women are initially responsible
for child raising, reduced demand for household production leads to an increase in investments
in human capital and labor supply that is more than proportional to the increase in longevity
and larger than the one observed for men. The diﬀerential change across genders translates into
increased labor force participation of women and narrowing of the gender wage-gap.
In addition, and contrary to the superﬁcial intuition, the model does not generate increases
in female labor force participation or narrowing of the gender wage-gap as results of reduced
child mortality. Reductions in child mortality do not increase the returns to market attachment
directly, but they do increase the returns to investments in children. In our setup, when women
initially allocate part of their time to household production, the increased return from investments
in children is large enough to guarantee that female labor force participation and investments in
market human capital do not rise. Therefore, increased female labor force participation is directly
linked to changes in adult longevity, which is in line with the timing of events observed during the
demographic transition (more on this in Section 6).
This simple theory explains the rising presence of women in the labor market without resorting
to exogenous changes in culture, habits or preferences. Though deep cultural transformations have
certainly accompanied the social changes of the last century, the model shows that they are not
strictly necessary for these changes to be explained, and may well have been a consequence rather
than a cause. The changing role of women in society can arise as a natural consequence of the
same process that led to reductions in the size of families and to higher investments in human
capital. We argue that exogenous reductions in adult mortality — driven by technological progress
in medical and biological sciences3 — have two fundamental eﬀects: they reduce the returns from
3 Our theory has exogenous reductions in mortality as the main driving force behind all other demographic
changes. Though there are several dimensions on which individuals can invest in their own health, our focus here is
on changes in mortality brought about by technological advances or diﬀusion of previously existing technologies. An
extensive literature has pointed to the fact that recent changes in mortality have been largely unrelated to income
and living conditions, and are to a great extent exogenous to individuals and countries. This issue is discussed in
5large families and increase the returns from investments in market-oriented human capital. With
higher longevity, there are higher returns to specialization, which then increase investments in
human capital and the cost of time. A higher cost of time increases the cost of children, which
tends to reduce fertility. In addition, lower mortality reduces the gains from higher fertility,
reinforcing the previous eﬀect. This setup suggests a uniﬁed explanation for all the social changes
discussed above, and also sheds light on recent debates regarding their implications for future
generations.
Most notably, increased female labor force participation has raised concerns about the pos-
sibility of negative impacts on the quality children, due to reduced presence of parents in the
household. This issue has been the topic of a series of recent presidential addresses to the Popu-
lation Association of America (see, for example, Preston, 1984, Bianchi, 2000, and McLanahan,
2004), and is still subject of debate (e.g. Sayer et al, 2004, Gauthier et al, 2004, and James-
Burdumy, 2005). The model proposed here allows us to identify under what conditions increased
participation of women in the market will take place at the expense of child quality, and under
what conditions it will occur along with increased quality of children. This is done in a setup
that encompasses several social changes usually treated as diﬀerent phenomena: the classic demo-
graphic transition (understood as reductions in mortality followed by reductions in fertility), the
increased female labor force participation, the narrowing wage-gap, and the changing pattern of
parental investments in children.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature on
the demographic transition and the recent changes in female labor force participation. Section 3
presents the basic framework of the model. Section 4 discusses the eﬀect of adult longevity gains.
Section 5 analyzes the impact of child mortality reductions. Section 6 discusses the pattern of
historical changes generated by the model and the related evidence. Finally, section 7 concludes
the paper.
2 Related Literature
There are numerous empirical papers on female labor force participation, mainly within the liter-
ature on the determinants of labor supply. Typically, these papers concentrate on the analysis of
the proximate determinants of female labor supply. For example, the ﬁrst generation of models
of labor supply of women took lifetime wage proﬁles or fertility decisions as given, and analyzed
their impact on labor supply decisions (see, e.g., Mincer, 1962, Gronau, 1973, or the survey in
Heckman, 1978). More recent papers acknowledge the joint household decision regarding number
Preston (1975, 1980), Becker et al (2005) and Soares (2005), and will not be explored in further detail here.
6of children, investments in human capital and labor supply of women. This literature usually
tries to instrument for one of these dimensions of choice, and analyze its impact on the other
dimensions (Hotz and Miller, 1988, Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1985, and Angrist and Evans, 1998).
Overall, this line of research is mainly focused on explaining the determinants of labor supply at
a point in time, given the skills accumulated by women and the wages they face on the market.
The objective is not to explain the joint historical evolution of these variables or the long-term
pattern of change.
From a theoretical perspective, few papers have focused on the structural determinants of the
changing labor market participation of women and the narrowing of the gender wage-gap. In this
respect, Jones et al (2003) is the paper closest in spirit to the labor supply literature. These authors
calibrate a general equilibrium model of household decisions regarding labor supply and human
capital accumulation, and argue that the narrowing wage-gap alone is enough to explain a large
part of the recent changes in female labor force participation. In a similar vein, Olivetti (2001)
claims that there are speciﬁc changes in the life-cycle proﬁle of female labor force participation that
cannot be accounted for by the narrowing wage-gap alone. She then argues that technologically
induced changes in the return to one speciﬁc productive attribute — labor market experience —
can account for these patterns. Both these papers take the time path of wages — or returns
to productive attributes — as given, and try to understand the changes in female labor force
participation from that. As argued before, our goal is to go one step further, and also understand
what determines the changes in the market wages faced by women.
With a diﬀerent perspective, Greenwood et al (2004) suggest that a major force determin-
ing the liberation of women from household chores was the technological revolution in household
production induced by the birth of electricity. The introduction of electricity in the household
— followed by a series of new durable goods — liberated women from household production and
allowed increased labor force participation, without implying a reduction in the consumption of
home produced goods. Goldin and Katz (2002), on the other hand, suggest that a technological
innovation of a diﬀerent nature was the main factor determining the changes in women’s profes-
sional choices. They argue that the introduction of the oral contraceptive in 1960 was the driving
force behind the changes in women’s career and marriage decisions in the US.
Though the mechanisms described in the last two paragraphs are important components of the
changes observed in women’s attachment to the labor market, they leave out key transformations
that took place at the core of the family unit. It is diﬃcult to conceive that the change in female
labor force participation is not intrinsically related to the substantial reduction in family size
that characterizes the demographic transition. Reduced wage-gap, increased return to market
7experience, and the availability of new household technologies are factors that certainly allowed
and induced women’s increased participation in the labor market at the observed pace. But the
underlying factor that determined these changes — or the demand for the new technologies — must
be linked to the determinant of the prior reductions in fertility. The fact that these changes were
observed in various parts of the world, under diﬀerent circumstances and at diﬀerent points in time,
suggests that they cannot be entirely attributed to technological or institutional transformations
particular to one speciﬁcc o u n t r y .
In this respect, the theory proposed here is closest in spirit to the work of Galor and Weil (1996).
These authors analyze the process of increased participation of women in the labor market as a
joint consequence of the reduced demand for children induced by economic growth. In their model,
women are assumed to have comparative advantage in mental labor, as opposed to physical labor.
In addition, capital is assumed to be complementary to mental labor, so that growth induced
by capital accumulation tends to increase the relative return to mental labor and, therefore, the
relative wage of women. In a situation where the capital stock is small, and the return to physical
capital relatively high, women specialize in raising children. But capital accumulation increases
the relative wage of women, therefore increasing the opportunity cost of children, reducing fertility,
and raising female labor force participation.
We share the same basic goal of Galor and Weil (1996), but key aspects of our theory diﬀer
from theirs, and we also extend the analysis in new directions. First, we focus on the reductions in
mortality that characterize the onset of demographic transition as the only reason behind all the
changes observed thereafter, while Galor and Weil (1996) do not incorporate mortality changes
as part of the transition. Second, the only diﬀerence between men and women in our model is
that women are more productive at raising children (childbearing, breast-feeding, etc.), while they
rely on diﬀerential productivity of men and women in physical and mental labor. And third, we
explore the consequences of these changes for parental investments in children and, ultimately, for
the quality of children, while they do not incorporate investments in children in their model.
Experiences of demographic transition in the vast majority of cases have been characterized
by initial reductions in mortality that are, after some delay, followed by reductions in fertility
(see, e.g., Heer and Smith, 1968, Cassen, 1978, Kirk, 1996, and Mason, 1997). This has taken
place in diﬀerent areas of the world at very diﬀerent development levels, so that to link the
changes exclusively to economic growth does not seem fully satisfactory. This paper follows the
literature that stresses the interaction between fertility and investments in human capital as one of
the distinguishing features of modern economies, and as the main determinant of the diﬀerential
behavior of population before and after the demographic transition (as Becker et al, 1990). As
8Meltzer (1992) and Soares (2005), the paper explores the particular way in which health aﬀects
this interaction in order to understand the long term determinants of social changes.
We propose a theory that places reductions in mortality at the center stage in explaining the
long-term behavior of society. In addition, we start from a model where women’s specialization
in household production arises for a very natural reason: women are relatively more productive
at raising children. This can be interpreted as reﬂecting the simple fact that women are the
ones that actually bear children and are capable of breast-feeding. Our main question then is
the following. When the only diﬀerence between men and women is that women are relatively
more productive at raising children, can reductions in mortality generate: (i) reduced fertility,
(ii) increased investments in market-oriented human capital, (iii) increased female labor force
participation, and (iv) a narrowing of the gender wage-gap?
Finally, there are important implications of the increased labor force participation of women
that have not yet been addressed in the theoretical literature. A large body of empirical work has
tried to evaluate whether increased labor force participation of women has come at the expense of
parental investments in children (see, e.g., Gershuny and Robinson, 1988, Bianchi, 2000, Gauthier
et al, 2004, and Sayer et al, 2004). By placing this question within a broader context, we can
understand the circumstances under which increased female labor force participation will come
with reductions or increases in the quality of children.
3T h e M o d e l
Consider an economy inhabited by families that live for a deterministic amount of time. Each
family is composed by a male and a female (denoted by subscripts m and f, respectively), who
jointly decide on the allocation of time of each member towards investments in adult human capital,
work, and raising children. As in Galor and Weil (1996), fertility is realized in terms of couples
who grow up to be a household, so that we abstract from questions of matching and the formation
of families. Each member of the family is endowed with a level of basic human capital determined
from the previous generation’s decision (both members receive the same level of basic human
capital). This basic human capital determines the productivity of these individuals in acquiring
market human capital and raising children. Market human capital, on its turn, determines the
productivity of each unit of time allocated to labor supply, and goods produced in the market
may be used for consumption or investment in children.
In such context, where we incorporate the eﬀects of mortality, quality of children cannot be
understood simply as productive human capital. Evolutionary considerations lead to a formulation
where parents derive utility not only from the number of children and human capital of each child,
9but also from the child mortality rate and adult longevity faced by the children. In addition,
these considerations imply that parents regard life expectancy and fertility in similar ways. This
formulation requires the recognition that adult longevity can be seen as an additional dimension
of oﬀspring quality, justiﬁed by the fact that survival into adulthood aﬀected evolutionary ﬁtness
in earlier hunter-gatherer populations (due to the necessity of providing to oﬀspring until the
early teenage years). It also implies the existence of a biological trade-oﬀ between quantity and
quality of oﬀspring (for a detailed discussion, see Robson and Kaplan, 2003, Robson, 2004, or
Soares, 2005). In this case, natural selection imposes a trade-oﬀ between life expectancy and
number of oﬀspring (fertility) that, if recognized by preferences, implies a dominant evolutionary
strategy. This is the logic underlying a recent model developed by Robson (2004, section 3), in
which preferences that aim at maximizing the product of life expectancy (quality) and fertility
(quantity) arise as evolutionarily dominant in the long run. In his model, the relation between
life expectancy and fertility is relevant for purely biological reasons. But their interaction in the
induced preferences is exactly the same as assumed here: parents’ utility depends on the product
of number and life expectancy of oﬀspring. This same idea is implicit in traditional arguments
relating child mortality to fertility, where parents are assumed to derive utility from the number
of surviving children. Here we follow Soares (2005) and extend it to later ages, by assuming that
parents also care about the adult longevity of their oﬀspring. This is a natural extension once we
consider that parents are concerned not only with the immediate survival of their children, but
with the continuing survival of their lineage. In this case, families should care about whether their
children would live long enough to have and raise their own oﬀspring, therefore guaranteeing the
long term survival of descendents.
For these reasons, we adopt a simpliﬁed version of the formulation proposed in Soares (2005).
Households derive utility from consumption in each period of life (c(t)σ/σ,o v e rT years of life)
and from children. We assume that parents derive utility from the basic human capital of children
(hα
c /α), and that this utility is aﬀected by the number of children (n), the child mortality rate (β),
and the lifetime that each child will enjoy as an adult (T). We assume that the discount factor
applied to basic human capital is a concave and increasing function ρ(.) of the total expected
lifetime of the children (nT (1 − β)), or the total of “child-years.”4 With this formulation, the
4 Soares (2005) shows that the main results generated by this functional form are also present under a more
general formulation for the ρ(.) function. Speciﬁcally, if the altruism function assumes the general form ρ(n,T,β),
and ε(n,T,β)=
ρn(n,T,β)n
ρ(n,T,β) denotes its elasticity in relation to n, the condition needed is sign{εn(n,T,β)} =
sign{εT(n,T,β)} = −sign{εβ(n,T,β)}, where the subscripts denote partial derivatives. We adopt the alterna-
tive formulation because it relates directly to the endogenous preferences results from the evolutionary literature
(Robson, 2004). In addition, it is intuitively more appealing and simpler.












where c(t) is consumption at instant t, θ is the subjective discount factor and 0 < α,σ < 1 .T h e
ﬁrst term is the utility that parents derive from consumption in each period of life, and the second
term is the utility that they derive from their children.
Production of basic human capital for children (hc) can use either one of two inputs. The ﬁrst
input (xT) is produced with time invested by adult members of the household, while the second
input (xy) is a good purchased with income on the market (at a ﬁxed price p). For simplicity, we
assume that these two inputs are perfect substitutes in the production function of hc:
hc = axT +( 1− a)xy, (2)
where a is a constant between zero and one. The household produced input (xT)m a k e su s eo f
the time of parents according to the following production function:
xT =( Bbf + Cbm)hp, (3)
where hp is the basic human capital of parents and B and C are constants. In this context, the
idea that women are more productive at raising children can be translated into B>C ,s u c h
that each unit of time invested in a child by a woman generates more of the input xT than the
same unit invested by a man. This hypothesis is maintained throughout the paper. It is the only
intrinsic diﬀerence between men and women in our model.
Basic human capital of each parent is also used, together with time invested in adult education,
to produce market (productive) human capital:
Hi = Ahpei. (4)
This is the human capital that is actually used to produce goods. The market human capital
of each member determines the productivity of each unit of time used as labor. The total amount
of market goods produced by the household is, therefore,
y = lmHm + lfHf, (5)
5 We investigate the eﬀect of technologically induced mortality changes, which are perceived as permanent by
agents. This is why we do not distinguish between parent’s and children’s adult longevity in this formulation. As
long as the changes are permanent, the long-run eﬀects are the ones discussed here, even if they apply only from the
children’s generation on. In this case, we could understand our exercise as comparing households two generations
apart.
11where li indicates the labor supply of agent i. The distinction between basic and market human
capital highlights the diﬀerent types of human capital acquired at diﬀerent points in the life cycle.
Basic human capital (h) refers to basic skills (language, motor ability, etc.) and general knowledge
accumulated during early stages of life, and while investments decisions are still taken by parents.
Market human capital (H) refers to the accumulation of skills related to a speciﬁc occupation or
profession, and when investment decisions are already taken by the individuals themselves. Since
the model is unable to capture all the subtleties of human capital investments, we understand
market human capital very broadly as referring to any type of human capital investment speciﬁc
to a particular task, including college and graduate education, professional training, and the
investment dimension of on-the-job training and learning-by-doing. The distinction between these
two types of human capital turns out to be key in identifying the diﬀerent eﬀects of changes in
child mortality and adult longevity.
The total amount of goods produced by the household is allocated between consumption and





exp(−rt)c(t)dt +e x p( −rτ)npxy, (6)
where r is the interest rate, xy is the goods investment in the basic human capital of each child,6
a n da l lt h ec h i l d r e na r ea s s u m e dt ob eb o r ni np e r i o dτ.
Each adult member of the family also faces a time constraint. Her/his adult lifetime has to be
allocated between studying, working and, possibly, raising children. The time constraint of agent
i is
T = li + ei + nbi.( 7 )
In order to simplify the problem and concentrate the analysis on the intergenerational behavior
o ft h ee c o n o m y ,w ea b s t r a c tf r o ml i f e - c y c l ec o n s i d e rations and set discount rates and interest rates
to zero. In this context, once we substitute for y in the budget constraint and for hc in the utility
function, the problem of the household can be written in a simpler form:
6 The model could also incorporate a parameter f capturing a ﬁxed goods cost of having children. But since
the economy analyzed here displays long-run growth, this parameter would be asymptotically irrelevant and would
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subject to lmAhpem + lfAhpef ≥ Tc+ pnxy,
T = li + ei + nbi,f o ri = f,m,a n d
xT =( Bbf + Cbm)hp.
In this framework, there are two forces working toward specialization. First, since women’s time
is relatively more productive in household activities, simple comparative advantage considerations
would lead to women’s partial specialization in household production. Second, the possibility of
increasing market productivity through human capital investments generates increasing returns to
the total amount of time allocated to market related activities (both investments in adult education
and labor supply together).7 The presence of increasing returns to market related activities
enhances the tendency toward specialization generated by any minor diﬀerence in comparative
advantages, and exacerbates ex-post diﬀerences.
Therefore, there can be no equilibrium where both agents share their time between market ac-
tivities and household production. Comparative advantage and investments in education generate
an incentive toward specialization, and at least one agent will always be completely specialized in
some activity. When agents spend some amount of time investing in children, there can be only
three possible equilibria: (a) m specializes in the market and f w o r k sb o t hi nt h em a r k e ta n di n
the household; (b) m w o r k si nt h em a r k e ta n di nt h eh o u s e h o l da n df specializes in the household;
or (c) m specializes in the market and f specializes in the household. This has to be the case
because if both agents share their time between market and household activities, the household
can always increase its total production by increasing the market time of m (there are increasing
returns to the total amount of time dedicated to the market). In addition, since B>C , if only one
agent works in the household, it must be f. It is also possible that both agents end up spending
all of their time investing in market human capital and working, in which case investments in
children are made using goods purchased on the market.
In what follows, we concentrate the discussion on the cases where women spend at least part
of their time on the market, and men are completely specialized on market production. Since
women labor force participation has been positive in modern economies for most of the recent
7 If ˜ ti denotes the total amount of time allocated to market related activities by agent i (˜ ti = ei + li), the
optimal allocation of time between human capital investments and labor supply is ei = li = ˜ ti/2. Substituting
both back into the production functions, this would imply a total production of Ahp˜ t2
i/4 for agent i.S o ,t h e r ea r e
increasing returns to the total amount of time ˜ ti dedicated to market related activities. This is the type of return
to specialization discussed in Becker (1985).
13past, this seems to be the relevant equilibrium from an empirical perspective (the other equilibria,
and the eﬀects of mortality on the transition between diﬀerent equilibria, are brieﬂy described
in the Appendix). Early stages of the process of economic development and of the movement
of households out of subsistence agriculture may be better characterized as a movement of men
from household activities to the market. This is a possibility that deserves further thought and
discussion, but we do not deal with it here. Our main focus is on the increased female labor force
participation that characterizes most industrial societies and also many less developed countries
that have already experienced the demographic transition.
4T h e E ﬀect of Longevity Gains
From the ﬁrst order conditions for an optimum (see Appendix), it is easy to show that, when the
woman shares her time between market and non-market activities, the optimal allocation of time
of m and f is characterized by
em = lm =
T
2
,b m =0 ,




Using the ﬁrst order conditions for n, bf, and xy (see Appendix):
ρ0nT (1 − β)
ρ
= α (9)








This is the same relationship found in Soares (2005), and it reﬂects the interaction between n and
T inside the function ρ.
Since mother’s time (bf)a n dm a r k e tg o o d s( xy) are substitutes in the production function
for children’s basic human capital (hc), only the one with the higher relative return will be used.
Analyzing the ﬁrst order conditions, one can see that there are two possible choices: one where the
investment in basic human capital is done using the domestic technology (bf > 0 and xy =0 ,o r
Equilibrium A), and another where this investment is done using goods purchased on the market
(bf =0and xy > 0, or Equilibrium B). In other words, in Equilibrium A the woman shares her
time between market and household activities, while in Equilibrium B both man and woman spend
all their time on the market, and investments in children are undertaken with goods purchased on
the market.
14Longevity aﬀects the investment in children’s human capital through two channels. First,
it aﬀects the choice of the technology to be used in this investment (extensive margin). And
second, it aﬀects the total amount of investment undertaken, possibly through both income and
substitution eﬀects (intensive margin).
Equilibrium A
We ﬁrst analyze the eﬀect of T on the intensive margin, when women use part of their time to
invest in children. In Equilibrium A, the fraction of time that the woman dedicates to the market
(human capital investments plus labor supply) increases in T. The fraction of time spent in the
household declines, but the net eﬀect on the absolute value of bf (investment in each child) is
ambiguous, since fertility is also reduced (see Appendix). The impact on consumption is positive.

















When women spend part of their time in the household, an increase in T increases overall
incentives to invest in market human capital, because the time over which the returns can be
enjoyed is longer. Therefore, the opportunity cost of time (and fertility) increases. In addition,
the gain in longevity itself also reduces the beneﬁts from larger families, and these two forces
together determine a reduction in fertility. The result is that the total amount of time spent on
market related activities increases more than proportionally with the gain in life-span, reducing
the fraction of time allocated to the household. In the end, the fraction of f’s productive lifetime
allocated to labor supply (lf/T) — the female labor force participation — rises, and the time invested
in each child may respond positively or negatively, depending on the relative responses of fertility
and the total time allocated to the household.
Understanding the market wage as the productivity of one unit of time allocated to labor
supply, we can deﬁne the wage rate as wi = Hi = Ahpei = Ahp˜ ti/2,w h e r e˜ ti denotes the total
amount of agent i’s time allocated to the market. Since gains in longevity lead to more than
proportional increases in the time women allocate to the market, while increases in men’s time
are just proportional to T, the gender wage-gap (1 −wf/wm) is reduced as the process described
in the previous paragraph takes place.
In relation to the quality of children, the response of investment per child (bf) to changes in
longevity, though indeterminate, follows a very speciﬁc pattern. For lower levels of female labor
15force participation (below 40% irrespective of the parameters of the model), increases in longevity
bring both increases in female labor force participation and improvements in the quality of children.
For intermediary values of bf, and conditional on other parameters, investments in children may
decrease as longevity and female labor force participation increase. But for suﬃciently high
levels of female labor force participation, irrespective of the parameters of the model, increases
in longevity are again accompanied by increased quality of children. Therefore, for a given set
of parameters, the relation between female labor force participation and investment per child is
either positive or non-monotonic. When the relation is non-monotonic, it starts as positive for low
levels of female labor force participation, turns into negative for intermediary levels, and becomes
positive again at high levels. Even in these cases, the quality of children increases with longevity
for the vast majority of initial levels of female labor force participation.
The claims from the previous paragraph are proven in the Appendix, but here we give the
intuition for the results. Three forces relevant to decisions regarding investments in children are
at work when longevity increases. First, the increase in longevity itself relaxes the resources
constraint and increases full lifetime income. Second, the reduction in fertility that accompanies
the gain in longevity reduces the relative price of investments in children. And third, due to
increasing returns to market related activities, longevity increases the opportunity cost of time
used in the household. The ﬁrst two forces work toward increased investments in children, while
the third works against it. For low levels of female labor force participation, the eﬀect of increasing
returns is relatively weak, so the ﬁrst two forces dominate. At the other extreme, for high levels
of female labor force participation, consumption is very high and fertility is very small, so the
income eﬀect is strong and it takes relatively little time to increase the quality of children. Also
in this case, the ﬁrst two forces dominate. The only situation where the third force may dominate
is the intermediary one, where increasing returns kick in strongly and, to take advantage of them,
women shift their time abruptly toward the market. In any case, it is not generally guaranteed
that this third force will be strong enough to overcome the ﬁrst two and, even when it does, it is
only in a relatively short interval.
Equilibrium B
In the case of Equilibrium B (market investments in children), the expressions derived before
fully describe the household’s allocation of time and its response to longevity changes. Both
adult members of the household allocate their total lifetime to market related activities, sharing it
equally between investments in human capital and labor supply. Contrary to before, the eﬀect of
longevity gains on the quality of children is unambiguously positive (dxy/dT > 0), but the eﬀects
16on consumption are ambiguous (dc/dT ≷ 0). In this case, changes come from the income eﬀect
and from the fact that increases in longevity reduce the returns from larger families. Since fertility
is reduced as a result of the latter, the shadow cost of investments in children goes down, so that
parents end up investing more in each child (there are no time costs in this case, and this eﬀect
can be seen as a positive substitution eﬀect toward the quality of children). Whether consumption
increases or not depends on how strong the income and substitution eﬀects are.
Summary of the Two Equilibria and the Extensive Margin Choice
In Equilibrium A, longevity gains lead to increased investments in human capital, increased labor
supply by women, narrowing of the gender wage-gap, and less time allocated to the household.
The ﬁnal eﬀect on the quality of children depends on the initial position of the household, but
there is a tendency for investments in children to increase with gains in longevity. Investments
per child may be reduced by increases in longevity only for an intermediate and relatively short
interval of values of female labor force participation. In Equilibrium B, on the other hand, women
spend all their time on market related activities and there is no wage diﬀerential between genders.
In this situation, increases in longevity lead to reductions in fertility and increases in the quality of
children. Though Equilibrium B may seem somewhat extreme (mother’s time entirely allocated to
the market), qualitative results would be identical if we imposed an additional constraint requiring
a minimal amount of mother’s time to be allocated to children. The only diﬀerence in this case
would be the absence of complete wage convergence between men and women.
Finally, the extensive margin choice of the technology used to invest in children is also aﬀected
by longevity. For a large enough T, returns to market human capital are so high that both
members of the household spend their entire time on market related activities, and make their
investments in children through the market. For lower levels of T, this may not be the case,
and women may share their adult lifetime between market activities and raising children. The
intuition for this is clear: for lower T, the returns to market human capital and the cost of time
a r el o w e r ,t h ef a m i l yi sp o o r e r ,a n d ,t h e r e f o r e ,i t is cheaper to spend time investing in children
instead of buying this investment in the market. As longevity increases, returns to human capital
(and family income) rise, so that women increase their level of education and the opportunity
cost of time. When this change is large enough, it becomes cheaper for the family to make its
investments in children through the market, and allocate all the available time of its members to
investments in adult education and labor supply.
Long-Run Growth
Diﬀerences in investments in children in this model translate into long-run diﬀerences in growth
17rates, since basic human capital determines the productivity of later investments in market spe-
ciﬁc human capital. In steady-state, the growth rate between generations is determined by the
evolution of basic human capital between parents and children.8 Changes in women’s labor force
participation may aﬀect the accumulation of basic human capital in diﬀerent ways, depending on
the equilibrium that characterizes the economy. In the case of Equilibrium A, the eﬀect is am-
biguous, but tends to be positive. This comes directly from the fact that longevity has ambiguous
eﬀects on the quality of children, which nevertheless are positive for relatively low and high levels











In Equilibrium B, investments in children are purchased through the market. Also, in this situ-

















It is therefore possible to observe an intermediary period when the growth rate of the economy
is reduced as women increase their attachment to the market. This is due to reduced investments
in children during this transition period. But eventually, the quality of children and the growth
rate start rising again as women intensify their attachment to the market. This tendency is
reinforced after women enter fully into the job market, and investments in children are bought
outside of the household. From this point on, the cost of time becomes irrelevant in determining
the quality of children and the long-run growth of the economy.
5T h e E ﬀect of Child Mortality Reductions
The impact of child mortality changes is much simpler in nature than that of adult longevity. The
eﬀects of child mortality on fertility can be seen, as before, from the expression ρ0n(1−β)T/ρ = α.
8 As shown in Soares (2005), a steady-state only exists in this type of economy when α = σ.W ei m p l i c i t l ym a k e
this assumption whenever talking about steady-states. To keep notation to a minimum, we are not indexing by
generations, and are distinguishing parent’s and children’s basic human capital by the subscripts p and c.T h e s e
are obviously related across generations. If we let i index diﬀerent generations, hp,i+1 ≡ hc,i.S ot h eg r o w t hr a t e
of basic human capital from one generation to the next is hc,i/hp,i = hp,i+1/hp,i = hc,i/hc,i−1.








This is the only direct eﬀect of child mortality in the model, and all subsequent changes follow
from how fertility aﬀects other margins of the household decision. In Equilibrium A (woman
sharing her time between market and non-market activities), the household allocation of time
between domestic and market related activities is also aﬀected by the change in fertility. The
reductions in fertility and child mortality imply a reduction in the shadow price of investments in
children (or an increase in the rate of return to the s ei n v e s t m e n t s ) .I nt h ep r e s e n c eo fi n c r e a s i n g
returns to market activities, the marginal cost of market goods in terms of time is decreasing in
total production (or, alternatively, the marginal productivity of goods is increasing in the total
amount of time allocated to the market). This non-linear time cost tends to magnify responses
to price changes. For this reason, the reduction in the shadow price of child quality represented
by the fertility decline is strong enough to increase the total amount of time allocated to children
(see Appendix). This is guaranteed to happen just because there are increasing returns to market
activities. Otherwise, the reduction in fertility would generate the typical price response of a
normal good, where consumption (bf or hc) necessarily increases, but total expenditures (nbf)
may not. Since there is a reduction in the total amount of time allocated to the market, female
educational attainment and labor force participation are actually reduced by reductions in child
mortality, and the wage diﬀerential between men and women rises. Notice that, nevertheless,
t h em a g n i t u d eo ft h i se ﬀect should be relatively modest when compared to the eﬀect of adult
longevity. This should be the case because changes in child mortality are, in nature, similar to
changes in the price of investments in children. Changes in adult longevity, on the other hand,
are similar to changes in both the price of investments in children and the returns to labor market
attachment.
In Equilibrium B (investments in children through the market), the reduction in child mortality
and fertility is reﬂected on higher investments in children, as the simple response of a normal good
to price changes. But the choice between the two equilibria is also aﬀected by child mortality.
In order to be optimum for the household to allocate part of the woman’s time to the market, it
m u s tb et h ec a s et h a tp a
(1−a)
B
A >e f. Since the reduction in child mortality tends to reduce female
investments in market human capital, reductions in child mortality tend to move the economy away
from Equilibrium B and toward Equilibrium A.
In both equilibria, increased investments in children lead to higher growth rates and, in the long
run, higher consumption (this may take place at the expense of reductions in present consumption).
19But, most important, reductions in child mortality cannot generate increased female labor force
participation nor a narrowing gender wage-gap. In fact, the model generates exactly the opposite
result when women spend part of their time on domestic activities: reductions in child mortality
lead to reduced participation of women in the labor market and to a widening wage diﬀerential
between men and women. This result highlights the key position occupied by adult longevity in
our theory. Speciﬁcally, reductions in fertility are not enough to generate the typical change in
women’s labor supply. Increased return to market speciﬁc human capital is an additional feature
that is essential in explaining the observed trends.
6 Predictions of the Model and Related Evidence
6.1 The Pattern of Changes in Mortality and Female Labor Force Par-
ticipation
In the theory developed here, the diﬀerent productivity of men and women at raising children
generate a tendency for specialization of women in household activities. But increases in adult
longevity change the return to time invested in the market and aﬀect the opportunity cost of
children. When women share their time between the household and the market, increases in
longevity reduce fertility and increase women’s investments in human capital and labor market
participation. In this case, there is actually an increase in the fraction of total female time devoted
to market related activities. Therefore, an increase in longevity leads to a more than proportional
increase in female labor supply and investments in human capital. Since longevity gains lead to a
proportional increase in the time men allocate to the market, there is an increase in the share of
the labor force composed by women and a reduction in the gender wage-gap (1 − wf/wm).
This remains true as long as women spend some amount of time in the household. When
longevity is high enough so that the economy moves to Equilibrium B (men and women allocating
all their time to the market), the gender-wage gap disappears, and so do all observable diﬀerences
between men and women in terms of economic outcomes. A less extreme version of this result
would be obtained if we imposed the additional constraint that a minimal amount of women’s
time were required to raise a child (pregnancy or breast-feeding, for example). In this case, the
gender-wage gap would decrease monotonically with increases in longevity, but it would never
be completely eliminated as long as fertility remained strictly positive. Therefore, if there is a
minimal requirement in terms of women’s time in order to raise a child, the model implies that
there will always be some residual wage-gap between men and women, due to the loss in labor
market time associated with it.
Maybe surprisingly, the model cannot generate this same type of link between reductions
20in child mortality and increases in female labor force participation (or reductions in the gender
wage-gap). Reductions in child mortality increase the returns to investments in children and, if
women spend part of their time in the household, this eﬀect is strong enough to guarantee that
the total amount of time allocated to the household will increase, and so will the wage diﬀerential
between men and women. More generally, the model shows that, contrary to common belief, adult
longevity — and not child mortality — is the variable that should be expected to be closely related
to female labor force participation. Adult longevity aﬀects directly both fertility and the return
to investments in market oriented human capital, through increases in the length of productive
life. Child mortality, on its turn, has a direct eﬀect only on fertility, or on the price of investments
in children.
This prediction is in line with historical evidence, since changes in female attachment to the
labor force only increase signiﬁcantly at later stages of the demographic transition, when the bulk
of child mortality reductions has already been observed and changes in adult longevity become
relatively more important. This would explain the lag between the initial reduction in life ex-
pectancy during the onset of the demographic transition and the later increase in female labor
force participation, as Figures 1, 2, and 3 illustrate. Indeed, the main issue that made it diﬃcult
to relate female labor force participation to the demographic transition is precisely the fact that
increased labor supply of women only starts considerably after signiﬁcant reductions in mortality
and fertility are observed. Our theory overcomes this problem by showing that reductions in
fertility are not enough to generate the movement of women out of household work. The latter
is only guaranteed when reduced fertility is accompanied by increased returns to market related
activities, which does not happen until later stages of the demographic transition.
This close association between female labor force participation and adult longevity, as opposed
to child mortality, is somewhat at odds with the accepted common knowledge in the profession.
Typically, female labor force participation is seen as closely linked to fertility, which in turn is
thought to depend to a great extent on child mortality. Therefore, one might think, child mortality
should exhibit a negative correlation with female labor force participation. In addition, the simple
fact that development brings together modernization and health improvements might mean that
this same correlation should be reinforced, even if not because of a strictly causal relationship
between the two variables.
The historical evidence discussed before shows that this is not necessarily the case. During
the demographic transition, reductions in child mortality and fertility start well before increases
in female labor force participation are noticed. Also in a cross-country context, and contrary
to common belief, this is not the typical pattern of correlations observed. Table 2 presents a
21set of cross-country panel regressions of the fraction of the labor force composed by women on
diﬀerent sets of variables. The diﬀerent speciﬁcations include as independent variables various
combinations of child mortality (before age 5), adult female and male mortalities (between ages
15 and 60), income per capita adjusted for terms of trade, average educational attainment in the
population above 15, total fertility rate, and country and time ﬁxed eﬀects.9 Income per capita
is from the Penn World Tables version 6.1, educational attainment is from the Barro and Lee
Dataset, and all the other variables are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
These regressions are not intended to imply any causal relationship, as this would require an
empirical eﬀort that is beyond the scope of this paper. They are seen here simply as a descriptive
tool, intended to reveal the pattern of conditional correlations observed across countries. The
goal of the table is to show that this pattern of simple correlations is quite diﬀerent from what
is commonly thought and, maybe surprisingly, is strikingly consistent with the theory proposed
here.
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Child Mort -0.0051 0.0436 0.0381 0.0339 0.0461
0.0088 0.0068 0.0068 0.0099 0.0072
0.5652 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 0.0000
Female Mort -0.0486 -0.0358 -0.0285 -0.0265 -0.0206
0.0127 0.0089 0.0089 0.0122 0.0086
0.0002 0.0001 0.0014 0.0304 0.0171
Male Mort 0.0745 0.0218 0.0171 0.0629 0.0105
0.0122 0.0094 0.0090 0.0106 0.0085
0.0000 0.0210 0.0570 0.0000 0.2219









Country f.e. no yes yes no yes
N Obs 453 453 453 453 453
R
2
0.32 0.92 0.92 0.42 0.93
Obs.: Standard errors and p-values below the coefficients. Dependent variable is the
fraction of the labor force composed by women (WDI). All regressions include a constant
and year fixed-effects. Child Mort is mortality under age 5 (per 1,000 live births, WDI);
Female Mort is female mortality between ages 15 and 60 (per 100,000, WDI); Male Mort
is male mortality between ages 15 and 60 (per 100,000, WDI); Income PC is income per
capita adjusted for terms of trade (PWT 6.1, rgdptt), Fertility is the total fertility rate (WDI);
Education is average educational attainment in the population aged 15 and above (Barro
& Lee). Data in five-year intervals between 1960 and 2000; 97 countries included in the
sample.
Table 2: Regressions for the Fraction of the Labor Force 
Composed by Women, Cross-country, 1960-2000
9 In order to make consistent comparisons, the table keeps the same sample across the diﬀerent speciﬁcations.
Qualitative results are the same when the sample is allowed to include all the observations available for each diﬀerent
speciﬁcation. The main qualitative results are also the same when child mortality before age 1 is used instead of
child mortality before age 5.
22Since the measure of labor force participation available is a relative one, we control for adult
male mortality in all regressions. The table shows that higher female mortality is signiﬁcantly
related to lower female labor force participation in all speciﬁcations. At the same time, in the
simplest speciﬁcation, child mortality does not show a signiﬁcant correlation with female labor
supply. But when country ﬁxed-eﬀects and/or other controls are added, child mortality starts
having a positive and signiﬁcant correlation with female labor supply, meaning that reductions
in child mortality are associated with reductions in female labor force participation. Notice that,
as speciﬁcation (3) shows, this correlation is not due exclusively to the relation between child
mortality and fertility. Though fertility is endogenous to the problem, the correlation between
child mortality and female labor supply remains positive and signiﬁcant even after fertility and
educational attainment are included in the regression. This should be expected if the driving force
behind these correlations were the change in investments in children, as the model would suggest.
The inclusion of income per capita and country ﬁxed eﬀects also shows that these correlations are
not driven by the association between the diﬀerent variables and economic development, nor by
any country-speciﬁc cultural or institutional characteristic.
Across countries, female labor supply tends to be positively associated with adult female
survival, and negatively associated with child survival. Even though these are simply descriptive
patterns, it is still true that, at the same time as they are diﬀerent from what is commonly
believed, they are entirely consistent with our theory. Further research is needed in order to
establish whether these correlations indeed reﬂect the causal links suggested by the model.
6.2 Female Labor Force Participation and the Quality of Children
As discussed before, the eﬀect of the change in longevity on the quality of children is not clear
cut. For lower levels of female labor force participation, increases in longevity improve the quality
of children. For intermediary values of female labor force participation, investments in children
may decrease in a certain interval as longevity increases, but for suﬃciently high labor supply
of women, increases in longevity lead again to increased quality of children. When longevity is
high enough so that women allocate all their available time to labor supply and investments in
adult human capital, the positive eﬀect on the quality of children is reinforced by the fact that
investments in children are purchased on the market, at a ﬁxed price.
The model can, therefore, generate either a positive or a non-monotonic relationship between
female participation in the labor market and child quality. For intermediary levels of longevity and
income, increases in female labor force participation may reduce child quality, while the opposite
23certainly happens for suﬃciently low or high levels of labor supply. When comparing these results
with the available demographic evidence on the allocation of time within families, it should be
kept in mind that there is one important dimension of the family’s problem that is absent from
the model. This is the one related to the consumption value of leisure and time with children.
Both of these are thought to be luxury goods, in which case they should increase with gains in
full lifetime income. We chose to keep these dimensions out of the model to keep things simple,
and make our main points as clear as possible. In addition, typical data on allocation of time
distinguishes between childcare activities — which involve direct personal contact with the child —
and general housework. In our model, all activities related to raising a child, including those that
do not involve direct contact with the child (cooking meals, doing laundry, cleaning the room,
etc.), are incorporated in the variable bi, and therefore should be counted as childcare activities.
Keeping these limitations of matching the model to the time-use data in mind, some recent
demographic evidence seems to support the type of non-monotonic relationship potentially gen-
erated by our theory. Gauthier et al (2004), for example, present evidence for the US, UK and
Canada indicating that average time spent on child-care activities was reduced up to the end of
the 1970’s, after when it started rising again. They also show that since 1960 average time spent
on housework by mothers was reduced by more than 30% (this reduction was partly compensated
by increased housework by men, but the compensation accounts for less than one-third of the
reduction in women’s time). Overall, time spent by women in housework and childcare together
was reduced by roughly 1.2 hour a day. The evidence also points to a diﬀerential behavior in
the allocation of time across activities that involve direct contact with the child and activities
that do not, with time allocated to the former typically being reduced less than time allocated to
the latter. This probably reﬂects diﬀerent degrees of substitutability between parents’ time and
market goods across the diﬀerent activities, as well as diﬀerent prices of the market substitutes
available. These are dimensions of heterogeneity that are not captured in the simple production
functions adopted in the model.
Sayer et al (2004) also ﬁnd the same non-monotonic trend in terms of time allocated to direct
childcare by mothers, with reductions observed between 1965 and 1975, and increases afterward.
In addition, they also ﬁnd evidence that activities involving direct and deeper interaction with
children have increased in relative importance. In particular, they show that the allocation of time
to diﬀerent types of childcare activities shifted toward “human capital-intensive” activities and
away from more basic activities (“teaching and playing” increases in relative importance when
compared to “primary and daily care”). Finally, they also show that reductions in fertility have
24reduced the total amount of time allocated to childcare.10
Ad i ﬀerent strand of literature whose results are also relevant to our theory refers to the direct
impact of maternal labor force participation on outcome measures of child development. Typically,
papers in this literature try to estimate the eﬀect of mother’s employment and hours worked on a
child’s educational attainment, achievement test performance, teacher’s rating, and behavior. The
results are largely mixed, with negative, positive, and quantitatively irrelevant eﬀects all being
common (see discussion and summary of this literature in James-Burdumy, 2005). In a recent
study, James-Burdumy (2005) addresses some of the problems common to the previous papers —
absence of control for family speciﬁce ﬀects and instruments for mother’s labor force participation
—a n dﬁnds only modest eﬀects of mother’s labor supply on child performance. Speciﬁcally, the
author ﬁnds that math performance at age 9 measured by the Peabody Individual Achievement
Test (PIAT) is negatively aﬀected by maternal hours and weeks of work in the ﬁrst year of the
child’s life, while reading is negatively aﬀected only by weeks worked. On the other hand, weeks
worked in the third year of the child’s life are found to increase the PIAT math scores at age 9.
Nevertheless, these statistically signiﬁcant results are quantitatively very small, and even extreme
changes in mother’s labor force participation can only explain a tiny fraction of the variation in
test performance. So rather than settling the debate, the results from James-Burdumy (2005) add
to the controversy. Our theory suggests that contradictory results in studies looking at diﬀerent
groups of the population, or weak quantitative results in studies looking at broad groups, might
be exactly what should be expected, given the possibility of a non-monotonic relationship between
female labor force participation and quality of children. A test of this speciﬁc possibility should
include non-linear terms in the interaction between mother’s labor force participation and, for
example, education or income, in regressions like the ones ran by James-Burdumy (2005).
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper proposes a theory where, ultimately, longevity gains are solely responsible for the
increased participation of women in the labor market and the narrowing gender wage-gap. Though
the direct link between these two phenomena may seem obscure, the intuition becomes clear
once other dimensions of the demographic transition are brought into the analysis. Increased
longevity increases the returns to investments in market oriented human capital. Higher returns
10 McLanahan (2004) argues that increased female labor force participation in the US was accompanied by
diﬀerential trends in terms of child quality for poor and wealthy families. But her focus is on issues related to
family structure and stability, and their impact on child development. These dimensions are not captured by the
theory proposed in this paper, so her evidence, though consistent with our results, cannot be directly used to
support them.
25to investment in human capital increase the cost of time and shift the quantity-quality trade-oﬀ
toward fewer and better educated children. In addition, lower mortality reduces the return from
large families, reducing fertility also directly as an independent force. With higher returns to
human capital and fewer children, women increase their investments in human capital and their
attachment to the market. Since women are initially specialized in the household sector, this takes
place at a rate more than proportional than the one observed for men, so that the gender wage-gap
is reduced. These changes also have important consequences for investments in children, and may
generate a non-monotonic relationship between female labor force participation and child quality.
For intermediary levels of women’s labor supply, further increases in the female attachment to the
labor market may take place at the expense of investments in oﬀspring, therefore reducing the
quality of children. Nevertheless, even in these cases, suﬃciently large gains in longevity eventually
lead to increased investments in children. This framework explains several social changes observed
in the course of the last century as part of a single process of demographic transition, triggered
by reductions in mortality.
AA p p e n d i x
A.1 First Order Conditions
Let Ψ, λf, λm,a n dΠ denote sequentially the multipliers for the constraints in the maximization
of equation 8. Substituting for hc and xT in the objective function, the ﬁrst order conditions for
c, n, em, lm, bm, ef, lf, bf and xy are given by, respectively:
Tcσ−1 = ΨT,












c aBhp < λfn , = if bf > 0 and
ρhα−1
c (1 − a) < Ψpn, = if xy > 0.
26A.2 The Choice of the Technology for Investments in Children













Proposition 1 There is a T∗ such that, for every T<T ∗, investments in children are done
domestically (using the mother’s time), and, for every T > T∗, investments are done with goods
purchased on the market.
Proof. The rate of return to investments using the domestic technology (marginal productivity




λfn . The rate of return to investments
using income is RRxy =
ρhα−1
c (1−a)









T suﬃciently low (in particular, for T<p a
(1−a)
B
A) RRbf >R R x y and investments in children
are done domestically. In addition, since e increases at least proportionately with T,t h e r ei saT
large enough so that e > p a
(1−a)
B
A.I nt h i sc a s e ,RRbf 6 RRxy and investments in children are
done through the market.
A.3 The Equilibrium with Time Investments in Children
When investments in children make use of the domestic technology, it is convenient to rewrite the
problem in terms of the shares of total lifetime (T) dedicated to each diﬀerent activity. Deﬁne
the new variables e∗
i = ei/T, l∗
i = li/T and di = nbi/T as the shares of total lifetime allocated
to, respectively, investments in adult human capital, labor supply, and domestic activities (raising



























a(Bdf + Cdm)hp, and
e∗
i,l ∗
i,d i ≥ 0.
Let λ be the multiplier on the ﬁrst constraint, and λi the multiplier on the second constraint
for agent i. In the equilibrium where men specialize in market activities and women share their































m =1 /2,d m =0 , and l∗
f = e∗
f. For each individual, the time spent with
investments in adult human capital and labor supply is always the same. Therefore, to save on
notation, we write ti as the proportion of total lifetime allocated to market related activities
(investments in human capital plus labor supply), so that l∗
i = e∗
i = ti/2 (ti = ˜ ti/T,w h e r e˜ ti was
deﬁned before as the total amount of agent i’s time allocated to the market).
Rewriting the problem after substituting for the budget constraint directly into the utility











































The objective function is concave on df and convex on tf, so we cannot, in principle, guarantee
unicity of the internal solution nor trust on the Hessian to verify that a point of maximum is
reached. The issue in question and the optimal solution to the problem can be better understood
















Conditional on being on this equilibrium, and given the choice on the number of children




subject to tf + df =1and with tf,d f > 0.
The optimum is characterized by f0 (tf)=g0 (df), where these derivatives are given by the left































6(σ − 1)tf +2( σ − 1)
2 t3
f +2 σt3
f (σ − 1)
i
< 0,
where the inequality comes from the fact that tf >t 3
f. In addition, these functions are charac-




g0 (df)=constant > 0,
lim
t−→0
f0 (tf)=0 , and lim
t−→1
f0 (tf)=constant > 0. So we can plot the functions f0 and g0 against










Figure A.1: Characterization of First Order Conditions 
29In the ﬁgure, we assume that the two curves intersect. If they did not, the origin would be the
optimal choice. Points II and III are the ones that satisfy the ﬁrst order conditions.
Proposition 2 Point III is preferrable to point II and, therefore, is the solution to the household
problem.
Proof. Starting from point II a n dm o v i n gt ot h er i g h t ,tf increases while df is reduced. The
gains in terms of utility are given by f0, while the losses are given by g0.S i n c ef0 >g 0 in (II,III),
III is preferrable to II.
Points I and III are not comparable on a strictly graphical basis. More rigorously, their
ordering would depend on the value of the integral
c R
0
(f0 − g0)dt. Point I corresponds to the
equilibrium where there is total specialization within the household (man on the market and
woman in the household). For lower values of T, the integral above is negative, and the optimal
choice is point I.F o r a h i g h e r T, the value of the integral increases and eventually becomes
positive. This is what characterizes the ﬁrst movement of women into the labor market.
Generally, the comparative statics of the problem can be analyzed from the impact of changes
in T on the curves f0 and g0.A sT increases, f0 moves vertically at a rate (1 + σ),a n dg0 moves
vertically at a rate 2α.11 In order for a steady state to exist in this economy, we must have α = σ
(see Soares, 2005). In this case, f0 shifts at a faster rate and, therefore, point III moves to the
right, corresponding to a higher tf and a lower df.
A.4 The Quality of Children in the Equilibrium with Time Investments






2D +( 1− σ)
h






where D = −(1 − α)(1− df)− (1 − α)(1− df)
3 + df+ df (1 − df)
2 − 2(1− σ)(1− df)
2 df and









Expanding the polynomials on D and incorporating the condition for existence of steady-state








< −(1 − σ)2 + (2 − σ)2df − (1 + σ)d2
f + σd3
f < 0.
11 This result uses the fact that, in equilibrium, (1 − β)nT is constant.
30The eﬀect of the change in longevity on the quality of children, therefore, depends on the
equilibrium fraction of time allocated to the household (df). In addition, the set of possible values
of df compatible with Equilibrium A being optimum depends on the other parameters of the
model. From the extensive margin choice between the two technologies, the maximum level of










Since the left hand side is constant and T(1−df) increases more than linearly with T,w ek n o w
that there is a T high enough so that this expression is satisﬁed (even though it may be already
with df =0 ). This is the level of longevity at which the family stops using time to invest in the
children and starts using market goods. Call this level of longevity and the associated fraction
of time spent in the household ˆ T and ˆ df, respectively. Notice that the expression above implies
that any value of df between 0 and 1 is always compatible with Equilibrium A being optimum for
some set of parameters. Particularly, changes in p do not aﬀect the intensive margin choice of df
in Equilibrium A, but do aﬀect the extensive margin choice between Equilibria A and B. So, for
any given values of the other parameters, there is always a p such that virtually all values of df
(corresponding to changing T’s) are compatible with the optimality of Equilibrium A.
In principle, this means that df can really take any value between 0 and 1 for any value of σ,
depending on the set of parameters. So, in order to check when the inequalities above are satisﬁed,
we have to check whether they hold for all the values of df and σ between 0 and 1. Based on
the inequalities above, the table below shows whether dbf/dT is negative or positive for a grid of
values of df and σ between 0 and 1.
It is clear from the table that, in terms of this grid, dbf/dT is positive in the vast majority
of cases (or, generally, it is positive in the vast majority of the area deﬁned when df and σ vary
between 0 and 1). Nevertheless, this result does not mean that dbf/dT is positive for all the
empirically relevant cases.
But is does mean that when female labor force participation starts rising from low levels
(typically well below 40%), child quality increases together with the increased attachment of
women to the labor market. After this process takes place for some time, it is possible that
further increases in female labor force participation are accompanied, in a certain interval, by
reductions in the quality of children. Yet, even in this case, this would be no more than a temporary
phenomenon. Further increases in longevity eventually bring back the positive association between
increased female labor force participation and child quality. This happens either because, as df
is reduced within Equilibrium A, the range of negative values of dbf/dT is surpassed, or because
31the household eventually ﬁnds it optimum to move from Equilibrium A into Equilibrium B.
Table A.1: Signal of dbf/dT for Different Values of d and σ 
d\σ  0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 
0.05  + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 
0.10  + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + - + + 
0.15  + + + + + + + + + + + + + + -  - + + + 
0.20  + + + + + + + + + + + + -  -  - + + + + 
0.25  + + + + + + + + + + -  -  -  - + + + + + 
0.30  + + + + + + + + + -  -  -  - + + + + + + 
0.35  + + + + + + -  -  -  -  - + + + + + + + + 
0.40  + + + + -  -  -  -  -  - + + + + + + + + + 
0.45  + -  -  -  -  -  -  - + + + + + + + + + + + 
0.50  -  -  -  -  - + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 
0.55  -  - + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 
0.60  + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 
0.65  + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 
0.70  + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 
0.75  + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 
0.80  + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 
0.85  + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 
0.90  + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 
0.95  + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 
Therefore, the model generates either a positive or a non-monotonic relationship between fe-
male labor force participation and quality of children. In the case of the non-monotonic relation,
increases in female labor force participation are initially accompanied by increases in child quality,
then by reduced investments in children (for intermediary values of female labor force participa-
tion), and then again by increased quality of children. Section 4 discusses the intuition for these
results.
A.5 The Equilibrium with Market Investments in Children
When investments in children’s basic human capital is done through the market, increases in
longevity reduce the opportunity cost of investments in children, because of a lowered fertility rate
and an expanded budget constraint (higher educational attainment on the part of both members
of the family)
From the ﬁrst order conditions in this situation, we can obtain cσ−1pn = ρhα−1
c (1 − a).W o r k -
ing with this expression and incorporating the condition for a steady-state (α = σ), we obtain the












32In addition, previous results related to educational attainment and fertility hold, so that we have
ei = li = T
2 for i = m,f,a n d dn
dT < 0.
When T increases, n falls and y increases more then proportionately (y = lmHm + lfHf =
AhpT2/2), so either c or xy must increase (from the budget constraint, Tc+ fn+ pxy = y). If c
increases, from the equation above, hc must also increase, so xy grows. If c falls, from the budget
constraint, xy increases, and so does hc. In any case, increases in longevity lead to increases in
investments in children.
A.6 Child Mortality and the Allocation of Time
Proposition 3 A reduction in the child mortality rate increases the amount of time that the
woman allocates to household activities.
Proof. A reduction in the child mortality rate reduces the fertility rate (see derivation in the
text). In Figure A.1 from the Appendix, it can be seen that changes in child mortality aﬀect the
function g. The reduction in fertility generated by the child mortality reduction shifts the the
curve g0 upwards, shifting the optimal point III to the left (increasing the amount of time that
the woman allocates to the household).
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